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"Hy whole conviction is that oUr image of and 
orientation in our social world will become 
very much easier once we realize that human 
beings are not economic in one of their 
pockets, political in another and psycholo-
gical in another, in other words that no real 
divisions correspond to these traditional----
conceptual divisi,ons". 
Norbert Elias 
I. Introduction: the state of development and peaoe researoh 
The study of development of societies has created a growing awareness 
among its practitioners that the academic disciplines in which they have 
been reared, are inadequate as tools both for the diagnosis and for the 
therapy of the problems with which they are concerned., Because they do 
not sufficiently understand the "mechanisms", the "dynamics" of the overall 
socio-economic and political processes, which they designate as "develop-
ment" l they cannot sufficiently cope ~rith the practicai problems to which 
these:processes give rise. It is not only in development studies that the 
need for multidisciplinary or interdisciplinary research is acutely felt. 
The same is true for what has come to be called peace research: the study 
of the causes of war and the conditions of peace. Both development and 
! 
peace research have emerged as the consequence of an awareness of urgent 
social problems, perhaps in the final analysis of the belief that the 
survival of the human species has become problematic, given the combina-
tion of the' availability of unprecedented means of destruction and the 
increasing competition for life-chances resulting from population growth 
and the direction of technological and organisational development. This 
belief stan,ds in sharp contrast both to the idea of progress, the basic 
assumption shared by the founders of the social sciences in the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries and to the idea of "having arrived" 1ri th 
which social scientists in the industrialized countries reassured them-
selves (and others) after postwar economic recovery had succeeded. 1) 
Both the belief that history ("objectively", automatically) moves towards 
certain desirable goals and the assumption that the present political and 
1) Examples can be foUnd in the ",'ork of \v.,,,. Rostow, Seymour Hartin 
Lipset, Daniel Bell, Raymond Aron. 
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socio-economic system would continue indefinitely could give a relatively 
large degree of confidence to social scientistso Especially after the 
second assumption became dominant, did it become easy for social scientists 
to find a niche for themselves in a particular discipline or specialisation, 
to study a particular aspect of society, economy or polity.without doubt- . 
ing the meaning and relevance of their activities. This conservative 
assumption together ,rlth the material and status advantages resulting 
from producing 'useful' information has been responsible for the in-
creasing specialisation within the social sciences before there had 
emerged a connnon paradigm by which these specialisations could be justi-
fied on the grounds of the progress of theory-building.2) The social 
sciences have in fact accepted as their (implicit) paradigm the structure 
of industrial society as it had developed in the context of multi-party 
states: " •• oao the division of the social sciences and the occupational 
role systems of industrialized societies are congruent with one another 
to a remarkable degree." 3) It is therefore not s:urprising that problems 
which transcend the framework of these industrial state societies could 
not be adequately dealt with by the, existing disciplines. Both develop-
ment and war and peace are in fact problems of mankind as an inter-
dependent, structured whole, of a world made interdependent by the process 
of expansion of the 'vesto At the same time that these problems were 
becoming increasingly urgent the industrial state societies have begun 
to lose the stability of the postwar period which ,vas based on a wide 
consensus that they had solved their fundamental problems, so that their 
future would only be "more of the same", while they held up to the rest 
2) I use the term paradigm in the meaning given to it by Thomas Kuhn, 
'~he Structure of Scientific Revolutions? Chicago, 19628 A paradigm 
is a set of "universally recognized scientific achievements that 
for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of 
practitioners"" A paradigm therefore makes it possible to practice 
what Kuhn calls "normal science", and compares ,rl th puzzle-so~lving, 
i.e. even though the rules and methods for the solution of problems 
are given, their solution still requires a great deal of ingenuity. 
In periods of 'scientific revolution', when the old paradigm proves 
ins;ufficient because important problems cannot be solved and new ones 
compete for its succession, scientists return to questioning the 
foundations of their discipline, acquire interests in problems of 
'philosophy' etc. 
3) J.F. Glastra van Loon - "Social Science and Social Change" in 
Development and Change, 1, 1969, pp.35-49. 
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of the world the image of its own futureo~) The radical protest move-
ments, that unexpectedly emerged in the Western welfare states in the 
sixties, have particularly affected the social sciences. In trying to 
shake the foundations of their societies, the new protest movements 
have made it clear that the foundations of the social sciences are 
shaky indeed, that they lack not only an established body of theory, 
but even a common paradigm and a method by 'which criteria to determine 
the relevance and moral acceptability of so~1-scientific research can 
be developedo5) Social scientists now seem to be faced with the choice 
between either simply going about their business - 'which in practice 
often means linking their work to the policies of existing public and 
private bureaucracies and helping these to increase their control over 
their environment - or admitting their dis-orientation and confusion as 
the first prerequisite for the development of new criteria for social 
scientific specialisation and cooperationo6) Every individual social 
scientist now is to a very large extent forced to create his own social 
science - again, unless he is able to function as an 'expert' or 
~) 
5) 
6) 
This is for example the message of the concluding chapter of Seymour 
Martin Lipset's influential book "Political Man", New York, 1960 .. 
\ilio couid now still dare to write: "00 ...... the fundamental political 
problems of the industrial revolution have been solved; the workers 
have achieved industrial and political citizenship; the conservatives 
have accepted the welfare state; and the democratic left has recog-
nized that an increase in over-all statepow.er carrie,s with it more 
danger to freedom than solution for economic problems" This very 
triumph of the democratic social revolution in the West ends domestic 
politics'for those intellectuals who must have ideologies or utopias 
to motivate them to political action"? The assumption of "more o'f the 
same" also runs through much of what passes for "futurology", like 
Kahn and WiSner's "The year 2000" and Brzezinski's conception of 
"technetronic society" .. 
For the' last problem see Godfried van Benthem van den Bergh, "Science 
and Reason in Peace Research" in Proceedinss of the International Peace 
Research Association, Third General Conference" Vol.I, Philosophy of 
Peace Research, Assen 1970, ppo220-230. 
In chapter 2 of his "A sociology of sociology", (New York, 1970) 
Robert Wo Friedrichs provides a long list of contenders for an alter~ 
native,to the "systein" paradigm, which he considers to have determined 
"normal" sociology after the second world war. He also cites (p. 27) 
a study by Mihailo Popovitch, who has reported that only six out of 
thirty prominent American sociologists ,\"hich he interviewed in the 
academic year 1963-196~ believed that their discipline could claim a 
single "over-arching theoretical posture"" Significantly, the domi-
nan~ response to the question ,\"hat they considered the most important 
problem for sociology was "social change". 
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'specj:alist'-. For some time the lack of theoretical integration has 
been hidden behind the screen of sophisticated methodology, but that 
screen is now also beginning to wear thin. \Vb.at remains is confusion. 
To a world desperately in need of orientation, of understanding how the 
world is changing as it is, social scientists have little to offer. 
Many young development and peace researchers therefore started to look 
for theoretical guidance in Marxism, because that does offer a theory 
of the development of human society, which incorporates socio-economic 
and political factors. But Marxism has the handicap of being not just 
another more fruitful theory. It has also developed into a series of 
contending political ideologies, guiding and legitimating the political 
systems of states and the power aspirations of political parties and 
revolutionary movements. This has prevented many }furxists from develop-
ing their historical-sociological theory - and those Who do tend to 
emphasize the inadequacy of its present theory.7) Marxism clearly 
offers an alternative paradigm, but it is not a fully satisfactory one. 
The strengtli of t'iarxist theory is its recognition of the importance of· 
the political consequences (shifts in power distribution; class form-
ation) of increasing social and economic differentiation (industrial-
isation, technological advanceJ. The concepts of class and surplus 
appropriation, and the analysis of the dynamics of "free" economic 
competition are scientific discoveries the importance of which has still 
not been sufficiently understood - for the obvious reason that they.are 
not comforting to the privileged strata in nearly all state societies 
of the present world, including most of those professing a Marxist 
state ideology. But Marxist theory is weak in precisely the same areas 
that the established lvestern social sciences have also neglected: 
state formation and national integration processes; the consequences 
of interdependencies between state-societies for the political, economic 
and soc:ial deveiopment within staie":sQcieties.Andthese processes 
and patterns of interdependence are crucial both for development and 
for peace research. 
7) See f.e. Norman Birnbaum - "The Crisis in Marxist Sociology". Social 
Research, 35; 1968, pp.31:1:8-380. 
,-
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As far as I know most attempts to get a better grip on develop-
ment processes or on the conditions of peace through multi_disciplinary 
or inter-disciplinary teamwork have also failed.8 ) This is not surpri-
sing: the lack of a common paradigm could not be but prohibitive. Either 
cooperation is impossible or the paradigm of one of the disciplines has 
to be accepted by the representatives of the other disciplines. In 
development studies economists have often succeeded in having their 
paradigm accepted as the common frame of reference, so that they were 
able to enlist sociologists, anthropologists or political scientists in 
their services to deal with the "obstacles" to the application of their 
theories. In peace research it have been mostly individual scholars who 
have combined elements from different disciplines for the theories which 
they have developed. 9) 
Both development and peace research have had to face yet another 
difficulty: the divergent value-orientations and/or political allegiances 
of its practitioners leading to as yet unresolved debates about the 
definitions of "development" and "peace",I°) in which often 'peace' came 
to mean 'development' and vice versa. The concepts of development and 
peace both have not only descriptive' memrlng, but also normative asso-
ciations. Both development and peace research are commonly understood 
to be problem and/or policy oriented.. That has to lead to "political" 
debates among its practitioners. But in these debates questions pertinent 
to diagnosis have very often become intertwined with questions pertinent 
to therapy.. How is the world becoming as it is? What do we consider 
desirable directions for world society to take? How can the process of 
social development be changed in desired directions? 
Even though diagnosis and therapy in practice are inseparable, 
I 
there: is still a difference .. Therapy poses greater normative problems 
than diagnosis. But therapy without adequate diagnosis is impossible. 
I 
8) S~e f.e. Michael Lipton. Interdisciplinary Studies in Less Developed 
Countries 0 Journal of Development Studies, October 1970, pp.5-l8. 
9) Most influential have been Johan Galtung, Kenneth Boulding and 
Anatol Rapaport .. 
10) See f.e. Johan Galtung"Violence, Peace and Peace l1esearch". Journal 
of Peace Research, 1969, no.3, ppo167-l9l and Dudley Seers "The 
Meaning of Development", International Development Review', December 
1969, pp.1-6 .. 
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In order-to--adequately--design-development- or peace --poHcies- the structure 
of development processes has to be understood. And to those sceptical 
of the usefulness of 'theory' or afraid that scientific knowledge -\'Jill 
inevitably be misused, I would reply that even if knowledge of develop-
ment processes is misused (according to criteria of development like 
equality or ecological balance) by policy makers, it will in any case 
according to one important criterion - diminish human suffering - be 
used beneficially. The more knowledge of the likely outcomes of 
decisions that policy-makers will have, the less blindly they can try 
to achieve their (perhaps abominable) goals, the less likely it is that 
they will feel forced to resort the use of physical coercion or terror 
when they meet with resistance. Therefore I believe it is justified to 
assume that distantiated diagnosis - even if misused by powerful 
bureaucracies or rulers - can help to reduce the human costs of the 
. struggles and conflicts that ",oJe call history .. 
2. The Structure of Systems or the Structure of Change? 
The social sciences have taken as their paradigm the structure of 
industrial state societies: societies with a highly developed division 
of labour, with a complex money economy, ",nth large central administra-
tions, 1nth one or more political parties, a high degree of urbanisa-
tion and only a minority engaged in food production. Each of the major 
social sciences - sociology, economics and political science - made the 
boundaries of their units of analysis coincide with those of territorial 
states. International Relations were only studies as subfields of 
econo~cs and political science, dealing with the political relations 
(conflict· and cooperation) between states and with international trade. 
Transnational interdependencies and processes have not been systematically 
studied by any discipline. Specialisation in the social sciences has 
been the consequence not of theoretical considerations, but of the division 
of labour 1nthin a state-society at a level of socio-economic development 
at which it became to some extent possible to separate the economy, the 
polity and the society from each other and treat and study them as more 
or less autonomous. The economic, political and social subdivisions 
within a society of this type 10Jere taken as a given, particular aspects 
and interrelationships of which could be made the object of scientific 
research. To use scientific method in the manner of the ~atural sciences 
"parameters" and IIceteris paribus" had to be introduced.. And this was in 
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turn facilitated by assuming the autonomy of the sub-divisions (now 
often called "sub-systems") of societies corresponding ,rl th the three 
major social sciences economics, sociology and political science. The 
object of social scientific research in the conception of social science 
based on a model derived from the natural sciences (at a particular 
stage of their development) was to develop generalisations and even-
tually theories about relations between "variables" tested through 
comparative analysis of different "systems". To find explanations 
for the historical development of societies and their interrelations 
could in that conception not be a task for the social sciences. Their 
perspective thus had to be static. 
Next to the empirical social sciences ,vhich implicitly took the 
structure of industrial state societies as it nOlV is as their frame-
work, explicit attempts to articulate a paradigm have also been made. 
In sociology Talcott Parsons's representation of society as a "structural-
functional system", the maintenance, adaptation to the environment and 
integration of which was assured primarily by a "central value system" 
was the most influential.. As Friedrichs notes, "system" and "function" 
became the major organizing principles of the textbooks with which a 
whole post~war generation of sociologists was reared. 11) In political 
science David Easton's "The Political System" was similarly influential. 
The ';'system" paradigm and the implicit image of Western society as 
havirig become inherently stable fitted together perfectly. As To Botto-
more, has remarked 00.0. "It is easy to see how the ideas of Ustable 
democracy" and the "end of ideology" fit into this functionalist scheme 
(of Parsons, vdB). A "stable democracy" can be represented as a well-
nigh perfect example of a society in equilibrium while the cessation of 
ideological conflict - notedly in the specific form of the conflict 
.between classes - can be interpreted as the culmination of a process 
of adaptation and integration, which is accomplished through the ·working 
of the central democratic values"o12) 
11) Friedrichs, op.cit" ppo 19-23 0 "The new Ph.D. had no need, during 
this period, to underpin each empirical or theoretical venture 
,vith his own first principles, his own language, methods and 
standards. The system paradigm was set do,~ for him in lectllre 
and text as "given". Those who proved to be ideologically or 
psychologically inunune to the frame were apt to be written off as 
idd.osyncratic and consigned to the speculative arena of philosophy 
or to the deserted halls of activism". 
12) T. Bottomore "Conservative Man" - The New York lieview of Books, XV, 
§, October 1970, pp.20-2q. 
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Toc_-think -in-terms--of--a system paradigm -.whe.ther --of --the- '-str-uctural ... 
functional', the 'cybernetic' or the 'general systems' variety - implies 
a particular conception of development and change. Structural functional-
ism and systems theory have often been attacked for not being able at 
all to deal ·with conflict and change. 13) Their representatives deny 
that equilibrium, homeostatis, stability, they say, do_ not preclude 
change: "an open system, whether social or biological, in a changing 
environment either changes or perishes 0.0.0 If a complex social 
organization is to survive critical changes in its environment, it can -
do so only by changing its structure or behaviour".l~) Change is then 
defined as a process of adaptation of structure and behaviour to 
environment~l pressures. But the units of analysis (states, business 
corporations, trade unions etc.) then have to be taken for granted. 
This can lead to extraordinary ahistoric statements like the follmring: 
"That Great Britain has survived through medieval, mercantile and _ 
capitalist periods means that as a national state it has ultra-stabil:l.tyll.15) 
But we cannot speak of "national statesll , in the sense of!politica1 
conununities seen by all their members as "nationsll with which they 
identify and upon which they rely for protection, before the nineteenth 
century. And in the medieval period even "states" did not yet exist. 
What "survived" is thus not the social organization "Great-Britain" but 
the geographical area, that is nOli controlled by a -state which is named 
Great Britain. There is no need to discuss here the stages of develop-
ment of English, Welsh and Scottish societies or the structural 
characteristics which distinguish the national state of the 19th and 
I 
20th centuries from the dynastic or feudal types of states which 
characterize earlier phases of a state-formation process. But the naive 
use of the term "national state" ,ri th reference to all of them is a 
good example of the inability of those who believe in this tYl)e of 
system theory to take the historical development of societies into 
account. 
13) See f.e. Ralf Dahrendorf - "Toward a theory of social conflict'· in 
Amitai and Eva Etzioni Social Change, New York-London, 196~, 
pp.9~-1l2. 
1~) lvIervyn L" Cadwallader - "The Cybernetic Analysis of Change II in 
Etzioni, op.cit., pp.159-16IJ,. 
15) Cadwallader, op.cit., p.160. 
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To think in terms of 'systems' makes it very difficult to see 
change as a structured process, to analyse and explain - which, as 
will be discussed late~ Elias has done - the directions of social 
change over long per:i.ocE of time. The "system" metaphor does not allow 
for such a conception of change. A system can adjust itself. If not 
it perishes (biological organisms) or it is transformed into another 
system (social organisations). But as Parsons himself has written: 
Ita general theory of the processes of change of social systell§, is not 
possible in the present state of lmowledge •. The reason is very simple 
that such a theory would imply complete lmowledge of the law·s of pro-
cess bf the system and this is lmow1edge we do not possess. The theory 
of change in the structure of social systems must, therefore, be a 
theor~ of partic~lar sub-processes within such systems, not of the 
16) overa~l processes of change of the systems as systems". 
I The conception of change as system transformation can be graphi-
callyl represented as follows: 
J 
System 1 
.-
System 2 
I 
change 
) 
time 
The uSe of this system transformation paradigm in empirical studies of 
social change leads to looking at change as the disruption of continuity, 
caused by factors located in a specific segment of time. For exrunp1e, 
in studies of international relations in terms of a succession of "inter-
national systems" the time segments selected have been the French Revo1-
1ution, ·184:8, 1870-1871, the first ·and second world war .. 17) In between 
such short transformation periods discrete continuous systems in dynamic 
equilibrium have to be presumed. Similarly, in economics the problem of 
development is also often seen as a problem of system transformation: 
16) Talcott Parsons - "The social system", Glencoe, 1951, p.4:86. 
17) Stanley Hoffman in "International S stems and International Law" 
in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba ed. "The international System", 
Princeton, 1961; Richard N. Rosecrance "Action and Reaction in 
World Politics: International Systems in Perspective". Boston-
Toronto, 1963. 
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"We know the structure of the·pre-industrialsystem, we know the structure 
of the industrial system, but what we do not know is what causes the 
transformation of the pre-industrial into the industrial system". IS) 
In other words: if we would know, we could bring the transformation 
about - and .the "problem" of development would be solved. The concept 
of 'modernisation' is similarly derived from the system image: one 
constructs an ideal type under the name "traditional society" or 
"traditional system", contrasts it with another ideal type "modern 
society" or "modern system", and represents each of them by a small 
number of attributes (expressed f.e. in the form of Parsons "pattern 
variables,,)19). 'Hodernisation' then becomes the process of trans-
formation from the first of these two static types of society to the 
• I 
second. Another problematic aspect of this type of theorizing is that 
the characteristics of the "modern system" are usually derived from the 
existing advanced industrial societies, and in particular from the 
United States. The system transformation conception of change, if used 
for poli,cy purposes, will then lead to attempting to remodel societies 
classified as "traditional" or "underdeveloped" in the image of the 
society classified as the most "developed", but perhaps better Called 
the most "powerful" .!SystGm. But on the purely theoretical level the 
varieties of systems theory can hardly do more than to interpret change 
as a disturbance, if they explain change at all. This relative remote-
ness both from empiry and practice has been justified by the fact that 
they represent a well-articulated paradigm and hence: "sacrificing the 
dysfunctional for the functional, the dynamic for the static, did not 
at the time seem too great a price to pay for clarity of focus";. 20). 
The consequence is that "socially important problems that are not easi-
ly contained within the paradigm are simply put aside,,21)- until they 
become so pressing that the paradigm itself is rejected, And that is 
precisely, what is happening now. The social sciences are in ferment. 
IS) Kurt }furtin in seminars of the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague. 
19) For an application to the study of the "international system" based 
on Parsonian catagories, 'see George Hodelski "Agraria and Industria: 
two models of the international system", in Knorr and Verba, oEocito, 
pp.llS-llJ:3. Not surprisingly Hodelski's paper: "elaborates 000. 
from a theoretical perspective the international models correspond-
ing to agrarian and industrial societies and touches only briefly 
upon problems of transition". 
20) Friedrichs, op.cit., pe22. 
21) Friedrichs, opocit., p.5. 
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A large part of the results of 'normal science' - to use Kuhn's 
expression - as they are published in the established professional 
journals appears to a gro,ring number of students of the social sciences 
as neither theoretically relevant nor helpful for the restructuring of 
socEties.They therefore find it necessary to be radical, to go to the 
roots m~r discipline, both in terms of the implied conception of the 
role of the. social scientist and of the fundamental image of its subject-
matter.,22) Up to now the former problem has received most attention: 
in a gromng number of programmatic statements and discussions it is 
alternatively argued that social scientists should become intellectuals, 
social critics, therapists, experts in the service of oppressed and 
exploited groups and even that they should stop being social scientists 
and become political organisers or guerillas. But the latter problem 
which has not gotten as much attention is at least as important. The 
sociology of Norbert Elias offers both an alternative conception of the 
role of the social scientist and an alternative paradigm - hence this 
invitation to his work. 
3. The task of the social scientist 
Elias tries to restore the long term perspective common to 19th 
century sociology to the present day social sciences. The social 
sciences should mruce it possible to orient ourselves better in the world. 
In order to change ("develop") the world, we have to know hmv :tt is 
changing in the ,yay it is o Diagnosis or a "detour via detachment" is 
necessary for more adequate and realistic forms of therapy.23) Elias' 
main work:UUeber den Prozess der Zivilisation: sociogenetische und 
psychogenetische Untersuchungen" was written in the years preceding the 
second world war. \~y did he at that time direct his research to what 
he has called the civilising process? 
22) 
23) 
;Friedrichs (op_cit., pp.55-56) believes that scientific revolutions 
: (paradigm change) in the social sciences involve not only a change 
in the 'Gestalt' of the subject matter of a science, as Kuhn analyses 
scientific revolutions in the patural sciences, but also a change of 
the ugrounding image the social scientist has of himself as a scien-
tific agent". But it may well be that the increasing awareness of the 
fact that natural science is linked to purpose, mIl also lead to a 
change in the role image of natural scientists. In fact, I believe 
that this has already started. 
For another defense of the role of the social scientist as diagnosti-
cian see J.A. Ponsioen "The Analysis of Social Change Reconsidered", 
19693, pp .. 19-21o 
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"The question--asked--derives less- frotuthe-scientific--tradition-in the 
more narrow sense of the word than from the experiences shared by tts 
all, the experiences of the crisis and the transformation of western 
civilisation, and from the simple need to understand, what in fact is 
the case with this ' civilisationlQl,?4) 
His 'conception of the need for a 'detour', which makes the 
relationship between sociological research and social action a two 
step procedure, is based on the recognition that long term processes 
of social change and development are blind, unplanned, but at the same 
time structured processes. Social science, if it deals with the problems 
of explaining how it is possible that long term processes are structured 
even though unplanned, can help to "bring the blind course of coercive 
processes, ,~hich are for human beings often meaningless, often destruct-
ive and which cause great suffering, better under control and to . steer 
them in such a way that they are less destructive of live, happiness 
and meaning". 25) Of course, the unplanned development of societies has 
led in our time to a greater scope for "planning" than ever before. 
Some measure of control over social processes by decision-makers is 
possible 0 But even the governments of the most p01~erful states have 
24) 
25) 
Norbert Elias - "Ueber den Prozess der Civilisation", Bern und 
l-fi'inchen, 19692 vol .. I, p .. LXXX. The second edition appeared thirty 
years after the first edution had been completed by the publication 
of the second volume in Basel, 1939. The first volume had already 
appeared in 1936& In the text of the second edition not a word 
'has been changed o Elias has only ~itten a new introduction in order 
to explicate more clearly the theoretical implications of the study. 
Further references to this work will be to: Prozess g Introduction; 
Prozess, I and Prozess? II. The other 1~itings of Elias to which 
reference will be ma(l.e are: "Problems of involvement and detachment", 
British Journal of Sociology, 1956, pp o 226-251; together with J.L. 
Scotson, "The Established and the Outsiders", London, 1965; "Sociology 
and Psychiatry", in SeH" Foulkes and G .. Stewart Prince "Psychiatry 
in a Changing Society", London, 1969; "Die IIOfische Gesellschaft", 
Neuwied und Berlin, 1969, "lvas ist Sozio1ogie", MUnchen, 1970,. and 
"Dynamics of Consciousness within that of societies", paper for the 
:1970 lvorld Congress of Sociology at Varna, Bulgaria. 
"Was ist Soziologie?", pp.13-14. Elias' justification of this con-
ception of the task of the social scientist is expressed most clearly 
in the introduction to this book pp.9-31. 
" 
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insufficient insight in the consequences which result from the inter-
1~aving of their own actions with those of other governments as, for 
example, the American intervention in Vietnam demonstrates.. Images of 
social reality of human groups tend to be mixtures of phantasy and 
reali ty-oriented representations: "The whole ~ history is up to now 
basically a cemetery of hUlilan dreams. They are often fulfilled in the 
short run, but in the long run the) end nearly always in an emptying 
of meaning and in destruction" fl 26. . 
Because the natural sciences have made possible an increasing 
control over nature, there is a tendency to believe that it is possible 
to apply the same kind of "rationality" - independently of the state of 
social-scientific knowledge - to social problems. Government and 
bureaucracies nowadays often pretend that their policies are "rational", 
1dlereas they are in fact the result of unsupported beliefs, routines and 
Short term compromises. Decisions are - and have to be - taken without 
sufficient knowledge of their consequences. In that respect, it is very 
misleading to call bureaucracy a "rational" form of social organisation, 
as Max Weber has done. The behaviour of decision-makers has indeed 
become ~ rational, compared with previous centuries. But the sectoral· 
division of bureaucracies, based on a strict division of competences, 
. . 
hierarchically organised and led by oligarchies who seldom think beyond 
their own sphere of power, gives present bureaucracies still far more 
the character of an untested IItraditional"·form of organisation than of 
a "rational' organisation -which can continuously be changed in accordance 
1rlth the requirements of its tasks. 
The task of the social sciences then is to provide mankind with 
more adequate understanding an.d insight in the dynamics of human inter-
~ 
dependence; "to expiore and make men understand the patterns they form 
together, the nature and changing configuration of all that binds them 
to each other tl • 27) This makes it necessary for the social scientist to 
28) . 
"hunt fOr myths".. The natural sciences have progressed in a con-
tinuous fight against untested, metaphysical systems of thought, which 
26) "'vas ist Soziologie?", p .. 13-11.1:0 
27) "Problems of Involvement and Detachment", p .. 234. 
28) "Was ist Soziologie?", ch .. 2, po5l. 
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powerful groups--in the society believed to be selfevidente The social 
sciences still have to accomplish a similar emancipation from social 
mythologies if they are to help preparing men for the use of more 
realistic standards of social action, both in inter-national and intra-national 
processes and relationslij..Fighting social myths remaina.a necessary''!iask" 
even within the scientific professions themselves, since very often 
groups of specialists unwittin~lY transform scientific theories into 
self-centred belief-systems.29 Elias thus pleads for distantiation 
as a necessary condition for the achievement of more adequate forms of 
diagnosis and therapy for the problems of living together that human 
beings cannot escape having. Contrary to what is advocated by radicals 
and policy-scientists alike - though from very different political 
perspectives - he warns against identification with the short-term 
perspective of any class, government of even academic discipline. 
But the impression should not be created, that Elias believes 
that his conception of the task of the social scientist is easy to bring 
into practice. His essay "On problems of involvement and detachment" 
is a painstaking analysis of the consequences of the fact that the 
social scientist himself is part of the process that he studies and of 
the enormous difficulties for the social scientist of attempting to 
achieve the right kind of balance between involving and distantiating 
acts. The follo,ring citation from this essay may serve as illustration 
of his way of viewing the problem: 
"But the growth of men's comprehension of natural forces 
and of the use made of them for human ends is associated 
lrith specific changes in human relationships; it goes 
hand in hand with the grmring interdependence of grolring 
numbers of people. The gradual acceleration in the 
increment of knowledge and use of non-human forces, bound 
up with specific changes in human relations as it is, 
has helped, in turn, to accelerate the process of change 
in the latter..Th.e network of human aQ'tivities' tends to 
become increasingly complex, far-flung and closely'knit. 
More and more groups, and with them more and more indi-
viduals, tend to become dependent on each other for their 
security and the satisfaction of their needs in ways 
which, for the greater part, surpass the comprehension 
of those involved. It is as if first thousands, then 
millions, then more and more millions walked thi-ough this 
29) For Elias' analysis of this process see "Sociology and Paxchiatry:". 
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world their hands and feet chained together by invisible 
ties o No one is in charge. No one stands outside. Some 
want to go this, others that ""yay.. They fall upon each 
other and, vanquishing or defeated, still remain chained 
to each other. No one can regulate the movements of the 
whole unless a great part of them are able .to understand, 
to see, as it were, from outside, the whole patterns 
they form together. And they are notable to visualize 
themselves as part of these larger patterns because, 
being henuned in and moved uncomprehendingly hither and 
thither in ways which none of them intended, they cannot 
help being preoccupied 1n th the urgent, narrow and 
parochial problems which each of them has to face. 
They can only look at whatever happens to them from 
thE!ir narrow location wi thin the system. They are too 
deeply involved to look at themselves from without. 
Thus what is formed of nothing but human beings acts 
upon each of them, and is experienced by many as an 
alien external force not unlike the forces of nature." 
But science has brought natural forces to a very large extent under 
contro~ although this does not mean that 'nature' is under human control, 
as the 'possibility of an "ecological armageddon" (Heilbroner) demonstrates. 
Nevertheless it can be said that approaches to "nature" in industrial 
societies are much more detached than they were a few centuries ago. 
I 
Elias has discerned in this respect "the principle of increasing faci-
litation": "It must have been extremely difficult for man to gain greater 
control over nature as long as they had little control over it; and the 
more control they gained, the easier was it for them to extend it." 
But with respect to social forces we are again and again confronted "lYith 
problems and 'processes which are beyond our control. And Elias 
continues: 
"Thus vulnerable and insecure as men are under these 
conditions, they cannot stand back and look at the 
course of events calmly like more detached observers. 
Again, it is, on the other hand, difficult for men in 
that situation to control more fully their own strong 
feelings -..nth regard to events which, they feel, may 
deeply affect their lives, and to approach them -..nth 
greater detachment, as long as their ability to control 
the course of events is small; and it is, on the other 
hand, difficult for them to extend their understanding 
and control of these events as long as th~cannot 
approach them ,vi. th greater detachment and gain greater 
control over themselves. Thus a circular movement 
between inner and outer controls, a feedback mechanism 
of a kind, is at w'ork not only in men's relations -..nth 
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, the non-human forces of nature, but alsoin-their--,' 
relations with each other. But it operates at 
present in these two spheres on very different 
levels. iVhile in men's relations with non-human 
forces the standard of both the control of self 
and that of external events is relatively high, in 
relations of men with men the socially required and 
socially bred standard of both is considerably 101fflr. 
The similarities bet1fflen this situation and that which 
men had to face in past ages in their relations with 
the forces of naturep are often obscured by the more 
obvious differences. We, do already know that men can 
attain a considerable degree of control over natural 
phenomena impinging upon their lives and a fairly high 
degree of detachment in manipulating, and in thinking 
of, them.. We do not know, and 1ffl can hardly imagine, 
h01v a comparable degree of detachment and control may 
be attained with regard to social phenomena. Yet, for 
thousands of years it was equally impossible for those 
who struggled before us to image that one could 
approach and manipulate natural forces as 1ffl do o The 
comparison throws some light on their situation as 
1ffl11 as on ours." 
~. The image of social reality 
One 'of the most important aspects of Elias' work is the demon-
stration by the practice of his research that it is possible as well as 
necessary to develop dynamic, instead of static models of societies. 
Only with the help of such models can the connections bet1fflen the actions 
of human beings and human groups and the patterns or configurations which 
they form be explained. 
The practice of his research: the paradigm which he has developed 
is not based on any a priori notions or on speculative reasoning. He 
has developed his models of the civilising process, the ' state and nation 
formation process, the process of functional democratisation and national 
integration and his more general game models by strugglirigto find 
explanations for historical transformations 0 \Vhy did European societies 
change from the decentralised and autarchic feudal units into more 
centralised dynastic states, in which often one person, a king or prince, 
could gain greater power chances than any other single social stratum? 
Why did dynastic states in turn develop into nation-states~ where the 
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ruling groups were recruited through political parties? Why has there 
been, first in Western E.'urope but gradually spreading in other parts 
of the world in connection 1nth analogous state-formation processes, 
a "civilising" process in the direction of gr01nng restraints on more 
spontaneous expression of emotions and drives (eating, bodily functions, 
sexual relations, agression)? What is the relationship bet~en 'civil-
ising' and 'state-formation' processes? IVhy has the direction of the 
shifts'in power balances in industrial state societies been the same, 
even though their specific histories have been very different? 
Such questions refer to unplanned and at the same time structured 
long-term social processes with a specific direction. But such pro-
cesses are reversible; they can go in the direction of greater or lesser 
differentiation ~d integration, centralisation or decentralisaion, 
they can go towards a strengthening or a lessening of external as of 
self-restraints. And often enough movements in both directions can be 
observed at the same time, with one trend gaining the upper hand over 
the other. To be able to observe and explain such processes and their 
interconnections is the reorientation in our thinking about social reality, 
which Elias tries to bring about. At present, social scientists are not 
accustomed to thinking in terms of a structure of change or development. 
This use of the term structure contrasts sharply with the present day use 
of the term "structure", which like "system" refers to seemingly static 
societies. Thus one speaks of the "structure" of a social or political 
system, an economy, an administration, etc. A structure is seen either as 
a set of institutions or as a pattern of relationships between "variables" 
that remain stable over time. Change is not seen as structured, but as a 
disturbance of the stability of a static structure. This static image 
of social reality is needed to justify the shortterm perspective of the 
great bulk of empirical social research. Implicitly social scientists 
let their method be determined by the image of nature, where recurrence 
is the basis of validation of theories. An already obsolete image of 
the structure of nature is used as the model for the structure of the 
subject-matter ,of social sciences. Social scientists therefore use the 
same conception of causality as natural scientists are believed to use 
and try to develop general theories of relations between "variables". 
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rrheories, they believe, should_ be @:i.ye:rsa)J.YllPplJ~lll~J~_, __ <:mAtl1eJ_l' __ 
"validi ty" should be independent of· the flow of time. As Karl Popper 
has said: " ••• 0 • it is an important postUlate of scientific method 
that we should search for laws with an unlimited realm of validity. 
If we were to admit laws that are themselves subject to change, change 
could never be explained by lawa ll • 30) Popper, it appears, does not . 
see clearly enough that to search for law·s implies an assumption of 
recurrence. This assumption has been eminently useful for explanations 
of physical-chemical connections, but there is no reason to assume that 
it is also useful for theorizing about the subject-matter of the social 
sciences. On the contrary, as human beings are born, grow up, become 
old and die and in the course of their lifetime enter into changing 
relationships with each other, to imagine a continuously changing 
stream and to ask for its long-term structure instead of a multitude 
of "particular cases" of an unchanging general law is much more adequate 
as a starting point for the social sciences. 
Few social scientists would deny that social connections are dia-
chronic and not synchronic, so that no adequate explanations can ~ver 
be found by using only synchronic data. Yet, a great deal of social 
research does precisely that. Many social theories (systems theory, 
structural-functionalism) are also static in the sense that they reduce 
all diachronic to synchronic relationships. This is of course not to 
say that particular social configurations cannot persist for a long time 
30) K.Re Popper, "The Poverty of Historicism", sec.ond edition, Routledge 
paperback, London 1961, p.l03. See also his examples of sociological 
laws, which he considers "analogous to the laws or pypotheses of 
the natural sciences" (p.62) like "You cannot introduce agricultural 
tariffs rod at the same time reduce the cost of living". It is 
interesting to ref~ect upon whom ,Popper would designate as the "you" 
in his example. I suppose he would have to admit that it is not a 
universal 'you' but the government of England in a specific phase 
df industrial development. He should then be questioned further: 
What is the meaning of "agricultural tariffs" before states emerged? 
That Popper believes that to strive for an "unlimi ted realm of 
validity" is meaningful) for sociology can only be explained by his 
obsessive concern with formalising scientific method. Elias points 
out an analogy with ethnocentrism. The method of the natural 
sciences·is seen as the model of a correct science in the same 
manner as ethnocentrism is expressed by the statement: "if people 
do not look or behave like us, they are not real people." (Was 
ist Soziologie, p.64). See also note 33. ~ 
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but the question to be asked is not: why is a normally sta~ structure 
changing?" but: why can configurations contain the ever present pressures 
for change and persist ove~ time? Why are individuals molded in such a 
1'lay that they take up the same position in a particular configuration 
again and again?3l) 
Once we realize. that the questions the social sciences ask have to 
be reforml,llated, we also have to ask why static paradigms and static ways 
of thinking have become so predominant in the social sciencesG Why have 
neither history nor the social sciences tried to study the structure of 
long-term processes? 
Elias provides us 1nth a number of explanations. Basic is perhaps 
what he calls the heteronomous determination of problems and evaluation 
of results, from 1'lhich the social sciences have not yet been able to 
sufficient~y emancipate themselves. As was pointed out already, social 
scientists themselves form part of the human groups engaged in the 
struggle for power and life-chances which is the object of their research. 
To study long-term processes it is necessary to distantiate oneself 
temporarily from the immediate short term perspective of the groups 
(nation, class, organisation, academic specialisation) to which one 
be10ngs.32) And the more intense the conflicts, the more difficult 
distantiation becomes, certainly for the social science profession in a 
particular nation-state as a whole. 
Great 19th century sociologists like Comte, Marx and Spencer were 
primarily interested in long term social processes. But this interest 
has disappeared in the 20th century. Static theories have become pre-
dominant and research into long-term social processes has faded out 
31) The term 'configuration' is introduced by Elias as a substitute 
for reifying, static general concepts like system or social 
structure •. Configurations are networks of interdependent human 
beings., m th shifting assymetrical power balances. 
32) It should be noted that Elias substitutes the terms "more autonomous" 
and "more heteronomous" for respectively "value-free" and "ideologi-
cal". This terminology helps to emancipate the discussion about the 
relations between social science and politics from the by n01v rather 
sterile discussions centered on the assumed pol~ity between absolute 
value-freedom or the absolute dominance of ideological evaluation and 
problem-setting over the social sciences. 
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almost-- completelYr-Tha-t- -this- is -indeedihe case can-be illustrated 
by the fate of Elias' own work "Ueber den Prozess der Civilization" .. 
lihen it was first published in 1936 (I) and 1939 (II), it seemed self-
evident to Elias that his book formed "the basis for an undogmatic, 
empirically grounded sociological theory of long-term social processes 
in general and social development in particular". He did not think it 
necessary to point out, that it was neither a study of an levolution' 
in the sense of 19th century sociology nor a study of an unspecific 
'social change' in the sense of 20th century sociology. It is, per-
haps, symptomatic of the changing configuration of our time that the 
importance of his work, almost completely neglected up to very recently, 
can now begin to be appreciated. It may well be that the fact, that 
western-societies are changing in a manner and tempo not expected by 
social scientists has something to do with the greater receptivity to 
long-term developmental studies - like those of Karl Marx. The static 
paradigms, especially in sociology and political science, are so ob~ 
viously at the end of their use, that a theoretical and empirical work 
based on a long term developmental perspective in advance of its time, 
can now come into its own. "Ueber den Prozess der Civilization" was 
republished in Germany and Switzerland in 1969 and is only now being 
translated into English, even though Elias has been living and teaching 
in England since before the second world war.. As Elias says himself: 
''If the different academic disciplines whose problem areas this study 
touches, if in particular sociology would already have reached the 
stage of scientific maturity, in. which many of the natural sciences now 
find themselves, one could have expected, that a carefully doclunented . 
study of long term processes, such as that of civilising and state 
formation processes, together with the theory proposed on the basis of 
this research, would have been thoroughly examined and discussed and 
that it wQuldthen after a critical survey have been-either refuted-or 
embodied as a whole or in specific aspects into the common empirical-
theoretical fund of knowledge of the discipline". Instead it i~ still 
an innovating work illuminating sets of problems, which need. thorough 
empirical and theoretical work today as much as thirty years ago. Why 
has Elias' work been neglected so much? liby has the static paradigm 
prevailed? 
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To this question belonging to the "sociology of soctology,,33) 
Elias himself provides some ans1vers in the new introduction to "Ueber 
den Prozess".. That sociology has neglected long-term development pro-
cesses can be seen as an over-reaction against certain teleological 
aspects of 19th century social theories, which tended to equate 
development with automatic progress - in the direction of their Oi~ 
social ideals.. Some elements of the developmental theories of the 19th 
century pioneers no longer quite agree with the growing stock of empi-
rical knowledge about society.. But even the earlier develollmental 
models, especially those of Comte and Marx, contain much that has 
retained its cognitive value. They could have been revised and correct-
ed in the light of the growth of.empiriQal knowledge .. This is what 
Elias has tried to do, and which made it at the same time possible for 
him to go beyond the earlier models. He has come to the conclusion 
~hat the reaction against developmental sociology has not been simply 
the replacement of social 'ideology' by social 'science', as is often 
believed, brit"a reaction against the primacy of certain ideals in 
sociological theory-building in the name of other, partly opposite 
ideals" .. 34:) During the 19th century the two industrial classes were 
33) In his paper "Dynamics of Consciousness within that of Societies" 
for the \"orld Congress of Sociology at Varna, 1970, Elias points 
out the curious fact that the theory of knowledge only asks the 
(static) question how the subject of knowledge can gain 'true' 
(scientific) knowledge of the object of knowledge, While the sooio-
logy of knowledge is concerned primarily with the we-oriented 
social and political ideologies, about which it asks equally static 
questions: "The prescription is: "Take a reasonable coherent,. though 
not necessarily consistent, complex of thoUght as presented by a 
writer or a group of writers at a given period of time. Relate it 
to the group situation of its authors during the same period. You 
1nll then be able to explain the nexus of ideas, of thoughts, of 
knowledge, as a function of the historical situation and structure 
of the group in thin which it or:iginates". But neither the theory 
nor the sociology of knowledge ask the developmental question hOiv 
it has been possible for man to emancipate his thinking about nature 
from magical-mythical images and subject-centerednesso This implies 
that this emancipating process is neither seen as a problem for the 
social·sciences, which are assumed to become 'scientific' simply by 
applying the scientific method, as formalised by the philosophers 
of science-(but probably not even practiced by the natural scientists 
doing e~irical research - not to mention paradigm innovators like 
Einstein)" . 
34:) Prozesse Introduction, po XXVII. 
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both enga~ed in ~Jlecific st~~g!~~! the eI~:!;r~EJ:'e_l!~~:ial_c.:t.~s_E! __ h~(tj:,o_ 
fight against the aristocratic and patrician elites, who still con-
trolled state powerp while the working class just started its struggle 
against the entrepreneurial class. The spokesmen of both ihese rising 
industrial classes believed in a better future. The scientific study 
of long term social development could help them to have their belief 
confirmed that the social developments of their own time went into the 
direction which corresponde:d to their hopes for the future. Both rising 
classes tended to experience the scientific and technological develop-
ment of their time as "progress" in the sense of being favourable to 
their own ideals. In the twentieth century this gradually changed: 
the two industrial classes become integrated in the national framework. 
The focus of attention narrows from 'humanity' to one's own nation. As 
the standards of living of both classes rose,however unevenly, the 
predominant social ideal became the maintenance and protection of one IS 
I 
own nation without any fundamental change in its form of social and 
political organisation.. The belief in "progress" made place for the 
belief in the value of the existing national social order, in its 
'stability's At the same time scientific and technological development 
is not seen any longer as 'progress', but as< 'growth' necessary to satis-
fy the demands of all the contending "interest groups" in the welfare 
state. From being progressive, the dominant climate of opinion in West 
and East becomes conservative. Elias mentions a .number of factors to 
explain this change: the world wars, the increasing acceptance of 
'national' ideals by both industrial classes, the end of the expansion-
ist phase in European history and the concurring loss of power of Euro-
pean nations, implying the impossibility to see a bright future for one's 
own nation in terms of traditional ideals of power, glory and prestige.35) 
The stress of 'national values' itself strengthen~d conservative tenden-
cies :!'i t takes the perspe·ctive a.vay from that which has changed and is 
changing 'to that which is seen as existing and unchangeable ll .. 36 ) Since 
American sociology in the course of the 20th century takes the lead, the 
American national image and ideals become the model for sociological 
theorizing. To understand the ideologioal influences upon SOCiological 
35) For the detailed argument see ibidem, p. XXXII - XXXVII 
36) Ibidem, p. XXXVI 
(\ 
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theories, it is for these reasons not sufficient to refer alone to class 
interests as is done in the Harxian conception of ideology_ It is also 
necessary to pay attention to the development of ·national ideals and 
nation-centered thinking. Elias demonstrates this by an examination of 
Parsons I s concept of 'social system', which he shows to be closely 
modelled on the ideal image of a nation: "all the people belonging to 
it are guided by the same norms because they are socialized in the same 
manner, they strive for the same values and they live therefore in 
normal circumstances well integrated and harmOniously with one another".37) 
The concept of a 'social system' is a construct, derived from the ideal 
of a presumably democratic nation-state: to see the nation as a harmonious 
community the members of which are socialized in the same manner implies 
I 
the assumption of a relatively high degree of equalityo.The20th century 
paraaigm of a stable and harmonious 'social system' as the basis for 
social theorizing, far from being the 'end of ideology', represent tqerefore at 
. ! 
least as much a mixture of social ideals and factual analysis as the 
developmental models of the 19th century. One of the differences is that 
in the latter case the future is idealised and in the former the present. 
How·ever, this idealisation of the present structure of the American nation 
is offered as a general model for the scientific study of societies at all 
times and in all parts of the world. It is difficult to see how one can 
use a theor.etical model of a society abstracted from a society ·with a 
relatively high degree of integration, centralisation and democratisation 
as a model for societies of all types and at all times. Does a system 
model apply to societies with a high percentage of slaves, or feudal and 
estate societies, in which not even the same laws apply to the different 
social layers, let alone the same norms and values? 
The explanation for the nearly complete disappearance of any interest 
in long term social development in the 20th century is therefore not to be 
found in the emancipation of social science from ideology, an assumption 
articulated by the "end of ideology" school·of social scientists and used 
by the great majority of empirical· social reseaJ,'chers to justify their 
practice, but in the replacement of ideologies implying automaticity of 
'progress' with ideologies idealising the status-quo. 
37) Ibidem, p. XL. 
But it is not~ ~only the-ideo-logicalreflection~~of the social 'and~~-~-~ 
political development of the West, that can explain the acceptance of 
the static paradigm by the social scientists. 
There are more lasting reasons to be ;found in the peculiar 
structure of, the Indo-European languageso38) Continuous movement or 
change is usually expressed in these languages by conceptualising it 
as an isolated object in a situation of rest to which a verb is then 
I 
added. We say for example: the wind blows or the river flows, as if 
there could be a wind that does not blow or a river that does not flow. 
Our languages force us to think and speak in terms which imply reduction 
of movement and change to a static condition.. Gro1ving up with these 
languages makes it very difficult not to accept this as self-evident 
and as the only possible way of speaking and thinking. But as Elias 
points out, Benjamin Lee Whorf has shown that Hopi language makes it 
possible to conceptualise in a different form than::in sentences based 
on substantive and verb, subject and predicate. Whorf has also suggest-
ed that the structure of our language may account for the great diffi-
cuI ties which physicists have had in understanding and c,onceptualising 
particular aspects of their research into atom particles.39) 
Elias Qelieves that it has hampered the development of the social 
sciences even more 0 Many sociological concepts refer not to conti-
I 
nuously changing human beings in continuously changing configurations 
but to isolated, unmoving objects.. This is the case With concepts like 
'norm t ,'value'; 'function v, i structure t , 'power', 'social class' and 
'social system'. The concept 'society' itself often carries the meaning 
of an isolated object in a situation of rest. The problem of inadequate 
conceptualisation in the social sciences is made even more serious by 
38) See Was ist Soziologie, pp .. II8-121. 
39) See Was ist Soziologie, note 28, p.200, which contains some critical 
remarks about the theories of lVhorf and Levi-Strauss e Whorf is 
criticized because he tends to treat languages as having no history 
or future; Levi-Strauss because he takes the structure of language 
as a model for social structures, instead of trying to discover the 
nature of the connection between the structure of languages: and the 
, struc'ture of the social configurations that use ,them. ' 
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the influence of the manner of thinki~g developed in the natural sciences, 
formalised into "the" scientific method. Concepts and methods in the 
social sciences thus both make it possible to split up social configura-
tions into separate parts, called 'variables' or 'factors', without much 
need to think. about the nature of the interconnections of the thus separated 
and isolated aspects of society. The tendency to think about social con-
figurations as if they were 'objects' 1nth an existence separate from the 
individuals which form them is reinforced by our unreflected experience of 
"societyll, of social institutions like the state, the bureaucracy, the 
army, the corporation, as having the pOlver to coerce us" The IIsocial 
coercionto'vards self-coercion" ("gesellschaftliche Zwang zum Selbst-
zwang ll ) which we experience is conceptualised by assuming a dichotomy 
between 'society' and 'individual'~ 'Society' and 'individual' are seen 
as each having a separate existence, normally in a state of rest, lvho 
at times lIinterpenetrate" one another, as Talcott Parsons has described 
their relationship. This experience of the relation between self and 
society is itself related to what Elias has called the 'civilising process' 
which has started in Europe and has spread from there to other parts of 
the world as a result of European colonisation. The 'civilising process' 
is seen by Elias as 'a structured change in the direction of increasing 
restraints on the expression of spontaneous emotions and drives (eating, 
bodily functions, sneezing, spitting, bedroom conduct, sexual relations 
and agression) throui6h socially induced self-control, maintained by 
internalised fear and shame. The process can.be formulated in Freudian 
terms - though Freud himself did not see the historically determined 
character of the psychoanalytic categories that he introduced - as the 
strengthening of the super-ego, the repression of the id (or sub-
consciousness) Inth the ego increasingly torn between super ego and id,becoming 
more and·more instable and therefare in need of certainty, orientation and 
order. But .the civilising process can only be lUlderstood as the psycho-
logical reflection of the transformation of social relations.. The 
process of internal pacification of large territories - state. formation 
increasingly obliged individuals to restFain their violent impulses. 
The increasing differentiation of socio-economic functions resulting in 
ever longer chains of interdependence required more rigid forms of 
organisation and regulation of behaviour, at first mainly in the. central 
-26-
coordiIiatiiig:-agencles C ( cotJrts-,- bureaucracies) and- inc-onnnerce~- and 
industry, but gradually spreading to the other parts of society. For 
these social functions a long term perspective 1vaS ever more necessary 
(in this century elevated into the new specialism Ilpl anning") which 
again required greater self-control. The social modeling of children 
demand~- ever more time and specialised institutions (schools) in which 
children not only learn the skills needed to function in a highly 
differentiated social network but are also forced not to give in to 
their impulses of the moment and to see the long-term consequences of 
th ' t' ~O) el.r ac l.onS 8 
Only in the context of this long historical process can it be 
understood why the problem of the relationship betwBen Ilsocietyll and 
the Ilindividual ll , both seen as static categories, has come to occupy 
such a central place in sociological ~houghto~l) Our present self-
experience as an 'individual' separated by an invisible wall from other 
individuals - called by Elias the conc,ept of man as an "homo clausus" -
is the result of this process: 
"Comparisons between different societies indicate that 
the feeling of aloneness, of isolation, of the ultimate 
separationaDi'independence of oneself in relation to 
other individuals, ,.,hich finds expression in the con-
cept of the individual that prevails today - of the 
individual human being as a closed system 1vi th his 
essentials hidden away from others 'inside' - is lacking 
in many other, particularly in simpler, societies where 
privatization of bodily functions and of feeling is 
neither possible nor socially required to the same 
extent as in ours. There is good reason to think that 
------------------~O) This very brief resume does insufficient justice to the riclllless of 
Elias observations, the originality of his empirical material (in 
particular his use of the books of etiquette written since the 
Renaissance, with which the civilising process cooi be clearly docu-
llle:n,te<l) aIlc:l th~e:[lOrmouslyfrui tful theoretical framework based on 
the combination of his empirical studies of the civ:i.lising and state 
formation processes. (Entwurf zu einer Theorie der Zivilisation, 
,Prozess, II, pp .. 312-1.i:5~)o For the relationship between increasing 
social differentiation and integration, the development of a long 
: term perspective and self-control see in particular Ent1rorf I "Der 
Gesellschaftliche Zwang zum Selbstzwang" and II "Ausbreitung des 
Zwangs zur Langsicht und des SeIbstz'wangs" 0 
~l) \feber and Durkheim, for example, both based their attempt to develop 
a general theoretical framework for sociology on the dichotomous 
relationship between the 'individual' and 'society' as isolated, 
static objects. Elias shows that these attempts could not be but 
doomed to fail. (Was ist Soziologie, ppo125-132). 
(, 
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. the feeling of oneself as a closed system, "In th all 
its conceptual representations, is symptomatic of 
the strength7 the evenness, and the all-roundness of 
the social restraints that are built into the emerging 
individual in societies such as ours through specific 
types of social pressure as much as through deliberate 
family training. It is, one might say, an expression 
of a particular conscience formation bred in particular 
societies .. " 42) 
'rhe image of the individual as a:p. "homo clausus" has its counter-
part in the image of society as a closed, static system and even in the 
image of the relations between states as interacting billiard-ballse43) 
It may be concluded that more adequate concepts and a more adequate 
paradigm for the social sciences are inseparable. To be able to think 
about social configurations and human beings not as static objects -
as Elias says: a human being does not go through a process of change, 
he ~ a process - requires a dynrulllsation and humanisation of our con-
cepts and models o In his own "lvords: Industrialisation means that more 
and more people ,york as entrepreneurs, employees and workers; II •••• 
democratisation means a shift in the balance of pmver t01vards what 'vas 
in earlier days seen as the "plebs" .. 
But that is not the only consequence. The reorientation in our 
thinking about society which Elias i work exemplifies, makes it also 
necessary to stop thinking in terms of the supposedly autonomous spheres 
into 1vhich we divide societies .. The 'social', 'political'and 'economic' 
spheres refer to different kinds of functions which human beings fulfill 
for each other, and which have specific interconnections. But if this 
conceptual separation is not based on a sociological model, "lvhich shows 
how these spheres are related to one another, the social sciences "lnll 
not be able to advance. As an example Elias mentions the phenomenon of 
taxation. Are taxes social, economic or political phenomena? Is the 
decision on the distribution of tax revenue a purely economic, political 
or social decision? Or is it the result of power balances between dif-
ferent social groups, which can only be accounted for by an overall 
dynami c mode 1 ? 
42) "Sociology and Psychiatrt; po128 o 
43) See Arnold Wolfers,"Discord and Collaboration; Baltimore 1962. 
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We have now come full circle -and~returned--to-the -motto-of this 
essay. By providing the answer to the question why the development 
of the social sciences has been determined to such an extent by the 
use of static p~adigms and reifying concepts, it has also become 
understandab~e that Elias' own work has been neglected. But it has 
at the same time become clear that satisfactory answers to such 
questions can only be provided if more adequate theoretical models of 
the structure of development of societies will be available. At the 
present stage of the discussions about task and method of the social 
sciences, it is still necessary to devote much space to such program-
matic arguments. Perhaps Elias w·ould already have had a greater 
reputation.if he would have spelled out the paradigmatical and 
theoretical implications of his work himself in the first edition of 
"Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation". But in that book he only cites 
authors that have provided him wi.th his empirical material. lie has 
consciously avoided exegeses of the theories of famous precursors like 
l'Iarx, Weber and Freud, upon whose work he in fact does build. His 
justification for this omission is significantly to be found only in 
a footnote, where he explicitly states ho\<1 much he is indebted to 
Freud: "It hardly needs saying, but it may here for once be stated 
explicitly, how much this study owes to the prior research of ~reud 
and the psychoanalytical school o 0 •••• it seemed unncessary to refer 
to this at· specific points, because that would be impossible ,vi thout 
an extensive discussion. The rather important differences between 
the whole approach of Freud and this study have also on purpose not 
explicitly been statedo"-':I:-':I:) Weber is explicitly mentioned in the 
introduction for his stressing the importance of the monopoly of 
violence for the form of social organisation, ·which we have come to 
call "the state". But Elias does not fo11o\<1 the sociological method 
of lV-eber. In particular he criticizes Weber's use of ideal-types. liS ) 
The influence of Marx is clearly demonstrated by his usage of the 
concept of class. Explicit appreciation and criticism of }Iarx can 
be found in Was ist SOziologie.-':I:6) 
-':1:-':1:) Prozess,I, p.32-':1:. 
-':I:S) Prozess. II, p.-':I:57. 
-':1:6) Opocito, PPo152-159. 
,I 
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It is difficult to prove, but I run fairly certain that Elias 
would have been better known, if he would have been more "philo-
sophical" 'and if he would have given more space to interpretations 
and critiques of the theories of others instead of just producing 
his innovative historical sociological research. 
This makes an invitation to his sociology still necessary. 
I believe that his work should be read and his example followed. 
" 
,) 
'I 
